

# New World Order- AKP-Turkey: Global Dilemma in a Nation-state

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**Abstract**—Underdeveloped countries like Turkey, must play their trump card; use every issue as a matter of negotiation in order to benefit from the globalization process. In this touch-and-go process, the main aim of difficult geographies whose social ties are on thin ice like Turkey is “gain time” rather than “make use of time” AKP is likely to make a profound profit and loss account following the elections because AKP did not acquired many things rather than diluting the influence of army on politics, increasing vote levels in East via identity politics, forming a bourgeoisie for itself. AKP became the first party in elections but injured. The party conducts international relations with the USA and EU unilaterally. These relations can be summarized as follows: “Solve Cyprus problem, not consider Nagorno Karabagh/Prevent army but we have a similar stance on headscarf problem with Kemalist secular segment/ Emancipate minorities, not demand about the rights of Turkish minorities in EU/Support countries which we support but not anticipate our support for the international organizations and actors which you support.”

**Index Terms**—USA, Turkey, AKP, Kemalism, globalization, nation-state

## I. INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION/ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The word “global” has a history of more than 400 years. However, the use of the concepts such as “global” or “globalizing” was not widespread until the 1960s. The frequent occurrence of the concept in academic studies started in the 1980s. (1) United Nations Commission on Human Rights defines globalization as “a process which is not only economic, but one which also has social, political, environmental, cultural and legal dimensions”. (2) Globalization cannot be reduced to political, economic, production or capital movements alone. It is a phenomenon which embraces several concepts. The power of today’s communication technology gradually increases the speed and extent of social interaction worldwide. All these processes lead to new social and political formations in the global level. The statements of Bulut, who problematizes the meaning of globalization, on this subject are as follows:

“Globalization, whose lexical meaning is the spreading all over the world or over some parts of the world of an event or commodity, as a geographical unit refers to the integration of the whole world, that is to the situation of having a global society and a global culture. In this respect, according to Giddens, globalization is the intensifying of social relations worldwide by means of local events being shaped by events happening far away. Waters defines globalization as the

decrease of the limiting effects of physical geography on social and cultural relations. According to Robertson, globalization is a concept which refers to both the shrinking of the world and to the strengthening of the consciousness of the world as a whole. (3)

In fact, every statement on globalization refers to a different feature of it. Globalization, which is defined as time-space compression in the broadest sense, is, according to Ohmae, the manifestation of increasing mutual dependence relationships. (4) When elements such as mass communication media, rapid transfer of information, benefiting from the fruits of information society are taken into account, it can easily be said that globalization is also supported by the communication reform, which is an extension of the technological reform. The virtual network, which forms the last ring of the communication reform, started with telegraph in the near past of humankind, and continued with telephone, radio, television, fax and computers, not only made information more accessible but also made people in the world come closer to each other by shortening the distances on the globe. In the latest elections in Iran, which seems like a considerably more oppressive and enclosed society compared to the West, the opposing party’s getting over the pressure of the authority by communicating via a virtual network, its arranging mass demonstrations, and the transfer of all the developments in the country to the outer world via cell phones despite the censor of the regime show the extent of the communication revolution. Moving from this example, it can be claimed that globalization is virtually connecting the world together with an invisible network.

In addition to this, the fact that the geography of the globalization wave which has taken over the globe is the Western civilization, that is globalization’s being led by multi-national companies with US, EU and Japanese capital bring to the mind the question of whether the subject of this period is multi-national capital or the familiar traditional hegemonic powers hiding behind this structure. Social scientists who evaluate globalization with a more moderate approach believe that the capital group which they think lead the process is composed of managers and local connections of multi-national companies (company fraction), bureaucrats and politicians seeking global objectives (political fraction), professional managers preferably with multi-national education (technical fraction), traders and the global media (consumer fraction). (5) These social scientists, who believe that transnational companies and multi-national enterprises act like an “invisible hand” in the market space and create a global supply and demand equilibrium, claim that the state which cannot keep up with the global market turns into an aged and out-dated structure.

## II. MAIN DYNAMICS OF TURKEY AGAINST GLOBALIZATION

XX century was exactly the growth period of nation-states. Polarization-conflict and transformation between different nation-states went on in the same process. Globalization is the main indicator of many dominant political-social-economic discussions following the dissolution of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and formation of unipolar system. Raising leading forces via multinational corporations and firms dominating the World markets point out that nation-states completed their missions and multinational unions should replace nation-states identified as main political actors. Despite all speculations, it is a fact that nation-state is an “umbrella value” for individuals and groups who do not have a positive stance on new world order and feel lonely and desperate due to the global corruptions as well as developments. (6-7)

It is more purposeful to mention a shell change rather than the end and/or eventual defeat of nation-state at current curriculum. Besides, share struggle of USA hegemonic power of world is concentrated on Middle East where nation-state concept proceeded slowly. The present article handles globalization/nation-state corrosion/discussions of New World Order from the perspective of Turkey which has very different historical features as distinct from other actors of Middle East hinterland. New approach of Turkey in internal and foreign policies under the leadership of AKP (Justice and Development Part) is evaluated with all alternatives.

### A. *Conservatist Approach Towards Kemalist Revolution*

On the other hand before explaining contemporary Turkish international politics, a political scientist should give brief information about domestic facts and Kemalist Revolution first. He/she also should mention the secular roots of the state founded by the revolution. Modernist laic, earthly program that targets the future that supported by the Kemalist elites was insufficient for the conservative main-artery approach. Conservatist theoreticians criticized Turkish modernization as being an effort that only had conceptions about future. Thinkers like Ülken, Tunç and Safa claimed that reactionaries think only the old time while the new regime exclusively plans the future, but both had vague steps. These thinkers who think that revolution cannot be further with the revolutionary ideal that “either all, or none,” demanded that in order to have the expected results from the past, the “present-time” must be built between the past and the future as a connecting bridge by keeping some of the old institutions intact. Otherwise, the same thinkers who believed that one cannot talk about progress and modernization argued an uprooted tree could not blossom (8). Some local political scientists define this cultural attack stage against Kemalism that can be seen among the conservative writers around the 1960 and the 1970s as a “period of semi-attack conducted by Turkish right against Kemalism”

The same political scientists pursue that during the Islamist governments that started in the 1990s, continued after their election successes in local and general elections, and eventually had the chance to control the political power alone since 2002 the threat against Kemalist state model increased

and the “frontal attack against Kemalism” stage was reached. When it is considered that up until the 1960s that Islamism, a handful of intellectual journal and association being exception, was either a sub-fraction of nationalism or it was lost in the endless colors of Turkish conservatism while veiling itself behind the “fog curtain” of main-artery conservative idea, it can be said that the pessimistic approach about the future of Turkish democracy prevailing among the laic groups is not completely unfounded. Even though it can be claimed that Kemalist system has supporters in the important sections of the society or majority of the society does not carry negative feelings against Kemalism, it should not be overlooked that societal sections that did not make peace with the new regime are seeking an opportunity to satisfy their desire to rematch that they had continuously postponed under the psychology of minority. AKP, being aware that the critical 10% of its bone vote are coming from those anti-laic electorate who could not make peace with the Republic, voices in its discourse that it is “conservative democrat” rather than being “Muslim democrat” (9). Still, AKP also knows that they cannot exclude these 10% that would keep them under the protection of the “political immunity shield” of the Turkish Parliament during the most rainy days of the party.

Despite the sharp decline in party’s votes, what keeps AKP in the power, of course, is not only the support of the regime opposites since the mid-1990s, right wing parties founded consecutive governments. However, their confusion about corruption, poverty and principle issues lead by the EU along with economic and moral decay led a fundamental change on central values in Turkish politics. While Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which was considered as a centrifugal political entity in the past, was transforming into a centre-party in peace with the regime, AKP, which gathered the intellectuals who lost their hope from the regime for whatever reason as well as those masses who seek political alternatives to achieve a better socio-economic status under its flag, claimed the position of the regime architecture. If we speak in Gramscian terminology, before 2002, central left (DSP), nationalist (MHP) and central right (ANAP) powers that established an anti-caesarian coalition (10) against rising Islamist wave were able to pursue a highly effective economic stability program against the economic crisis emerged in the country, but they could not prevent economic shrink. AKP, in contrast, continued to apply the aforementioned economic stability program and collected its fruits. Its crisis management success boasted its legitimacy both at domestic and international levels.

### B. *A “Democracy Attempt” seeking its Deep State: AKP Model*

Having reached the security of government experience, AKP started to introduce a series of structural adjustments. These adjustments were especially the ones that AKP believed the EU would support. These adjustments were applications to hurt values that composed “modus vivendi” of Turkish politics such as reducing the power of military on political balances, watering down the laic applications that gained legitimacy in public-sphere under the Turkish law, attempting legal changes to encourage veiling in public

institutions like universities and local governments. Besides its showy support against torture during the short period that the party had been in opposition and sensitive approach to the status of minorities along with its discourse that put the human rights into its center, AKP became a attraction center for those central right and left wing politicians and liberal intellectuals who were seeking future for themselves outside of their home.

Nevertheless, negative attitude that the AKP leadership took about the veiling issue that constitute the main axis of laic-political Islam paradox (11) as well as AKP leader Erdoğan's earlier depiction of democracy as a "vessel that is used or unused as pleased" did not reduce the suspicion that prevailed among the laic circles. Until they control the political power, AKP leadership passed the veiling issue over by moralizing charges for its supporters then u-turns, found it fighting against Turkish Armed Forces, laic media institutions, universities, judiciary and bureaucracy about any and every issue.

As a matter of fact, EU countries that come from strong civil society traditions supported AKP's so-called democratic expansion program as expected by also taking AKP's fast privatization program into consideration. However, there was a fact that the Western observers did not see, or not want to see. That is, as it was mentioned at the outset of the article, Turkey was not a country founded by the civilians. Both Ottoman modernization and Republic of Turkey were projects carried out by the military elite who also garnered support from the civilian bureaucracy. In a normal western democracy the values about the central qualities of the regime were jealously protected by the civilians. In Turkey, however, these core values are being protected and guarded by the military elite. Also, another peculiar feature of Turkey was the fact that, unlike what happens in the West, Turkish military elite receives much better quality education than civilian elites and they are capable of following world incidents calmly. Therefore, the "military nation" depiction attributed to Turks was not simply a reflection of Turks' naïve emotional attachment to their army, but sourced from the fact that for 170 years, military has been the main mobilizing force as far as shaping Turkey is concerned.

### *C. Ergenekon Trial*

The button was pushed for the Ergenekon trial on 12 June 2007. This trial was put on agenda just after the Constitutional Court's ruling on AKP's closure trial. The first case was brought to court 1 year, 4 months, and 8 days on 20 October 2008. Up until today, the case became a mess after additional accusations from the Attorneys and "shocking charges." As two defendants died because of their deteriorated health conditions even before they learned the charges against them and the crimes attributed to the organization, which as accused of "establishing an organization and carrying activities to legitimate political government," include almost every single unresolved political incident, these bring the issue of attrition of judicial institutions. Furthermore, when Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan's statement that he made in the parliament during the early days of the Ergenekon trial that he too was an "Ergenekon attorney" is combined with the statements below that included in the charges against the organization, it

increases the suspicions that judiciary was politicized by the sides of the trial:

"It is observed that the Ergenekon Trial was based on the statements of one Tuncay Güney who was believed to be working for the Turkish intelligence. Güney, who lives a sort of exile-life in Canada, claims that he is a rabbi. In reality, Güney, neither a Jew, nor a rabbi, has a political past that overlaps with the ones pursued by Islamist circles who did not like Jewish presence in Turkey. Also, prosecutors who carry the Ergenekon investigation both claim that Ergenekon suspects were supported by the United States and they planned to attack NATO bases in Turkey...Moreover, police officers who kept the records of over 1.5 million phone conversations and e-mail messages cannot answer how these records are leaked to the media known to be the supporters of the government (12).

All these developments are aside, many citizens regardless of their political views and whose number cannot be underestimated doubt that whether there exist a "deep state," a secret power that acts as the enforcer of the "real state." This concern is hidden behind the criticism against AKP government that it "became the government, without having gained power." This criticism irritates the government considerably. Since 2002 many liberal thinkers who openly support AKP government believed that this party would firmly comply with free market system in economy while removing social conditions of interventions to the political sphere that believed to be made by the deep state. Nevertheless, expectations were failed as expected by the laic circles. Leading media institutions that change ownership consciously after consecutive economic crises were gathered in the hands of capital groups known with their Islamist identities. Turkish media was officially divided between the two groups known as "free media & supporter media." This was followed by rumors that all transparency was lost in local government tenders. Businessmen who have opposing beliefs against the government claimed that they were excluded from public tenders.

In this concept, the idea that Turkey was divided into two camps in practice combined with misperception that claims the AKP and its supporters represent western tendencies while laic front's anti-western attitude started to find its echo in international platforms (13). Those circles that criticize the government mention that Ergenekon trial gradually turn into a revenge operation from people who are famous with their secular-Kemalist identities remind that people including former generals, university rectors, journalists, politicians, leaders of civil society organizations and trade unionist were either subjected to "aggressive police integration" under the scope of the Ergenekon trial or effectively put into jail. In the past weeks, Professor Türkan Saylan whose house was stormed by police was questioned by police for hours in the police station even though she was a terminal cancer patient at the last stage of her sickness. Saylan, who was the chair of the Association to Support Contemporary Life (CYDD), passed away only weeks after this incident. Her death caused grave concerns about the future of democratic process in Turkey. CYDD, providing scholarship to thousands of students to ensure that the education system would follow secular principles, is the biggest alternative to Islamist sects, which are very active in the education sector. Therefore,

putting pressure on this particular association along with judiciary, universities, some political parties and civil society organizations would create intensive crestfallenness may be not on those former leaders of the Kemalist circles whose life was already devoted to struggle, but on masses of ordinary people who do not like government's practices (14).

#### *D. Foreign Support for Conjectural Cooperation*

It seems that AKP is receiving support from powerful western actors. Both EU and the US want to stop strong reactions that may come from Ankara especially about Kurdish problem by breaking military's influence on politics in Turkey. Nevertheless, AKP-west relations seem like a "conjectural cooperation" rather being sincere "strategic partnership," for western powers realize that AKP's alternative is a "nationalist formula" composed of CHP-MHP. Especially the US is concerned about nationalist front government as it would pose problems both for Kurdish card and "Green Belt Islam" understanding in the "dangerous society engineering attempt" that this government is trying to developed in the Middle East axis. In a sense, AKP resembles to the "carrot" that Washington administration was posing against Islamist movements that the US denounces.

In this concept, AKP shows that under the condition that Islamist parties would allow free market economy and partial democratic atmosphere they could both developed harmonious relationship with the world's superpower while they could find their place in government. The West is presenting "Islamist democracy" example that it presumes to happen in Turkey as a model to "menacing countries" that it expect to behave. Nevertheless, it can be observed that the enforcers of this plan fallen into a strategic mistake, because when the development line of Turkish conservatism is taken into consideration, AKP does not follow a course of line from menacing to moderation as it would be expected from Iran, Lebanon and Palestine examples. Quite the contrary, Turkey is faced with a "menacing" movement that separated itself from a moderate conservative tradition that had lived under the shadow of Kemalism. These moderate conservatives even helped creating conditions for societal acceptance for the revolutionary laws. The West is presenting a model for countries that it advices to give up reactionary tendencies, but political program that it offers is trying to square itself with the tradition that supports western values. Difference between these two structures is that, unlike the beliefs of some political engineers (15), shows that Turkey's AKP type Islamic democracy is not the right alternative to put out the fire of Islamist movements. The Turkish side of the same process is not very pinkish, either, for in the Middle East where various radical Islamist components exist, social conditions that would require getting muse from Turkey, which turn its face by being radicalized, do not exist.

### III. FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATES OF AKP

Although Turkey is on focal point of historical hinterland of political trump share, the country can neither benefit from developments nor maintain a calm stance in order to make use of the possible results and/or opportunities of problematic process. On the one hand Islamist AKP government maintain a tacit cooperation with II Republican trend which supports AKP but can not receive support from nation on the other

hand AKP uses every means in order to disintegrate and assimilate secular-Kemalist ideology which is the main target for it. Therefore foreign support pursuit of AKP for assimilating domestic "enemy" causes put deep-seated and successful Turkish Foreign Policies aside. Turkish Foreign Policy is like a synthesis slurry composed of on-going commitments and susceptible policies in midterm and long term in order to receive continuous support of foreign sources which can sustain government.

Currently, Turkish Foreign Policy is based on "frail" assumption that USA would manage World on its own systematically and there would not be any rival country and/or countries at least in short/midterm. The contradiction in formation of assumption is not limited to this. Foreign policy provided by AKP staff degraded to two options: USA would be the only leader of World and this leadership would always be dependent on "Green Belt Islam" and key factor of this would be AKP. Dirty end of the stick is degradation of Turkish Republic to such an intense "dependent variable". According to the logic of this assumption, when independent variable USA changes its current policy, both Turkish Foreign Policy is disintegrated and current "executive" of this policy, AKP is swiftly of this policy, AKP is swiftly "purified" from decisiveness in internal policy.

The domestic reflection of game theory about abovementioned foreign policy is roughly based on harsh criticism of Turkish modernization process. Actually, it is concentrated on condemning modernist elites in historical period and condemning their followers de facto rather than Turkish modernization process. For example, either liberalist theoreticians or Islamist elites often complain that citizenship notion and related tradition was top-down dictated, "against nation" in Turkish society. However it was a necessity rather than an arbitrary preference of Kemalist leadership. Immanuel Kant summarized Enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity". (16) However Turkish Republic had to position citizenship on the continuous immaturity as per general perspective of society about acquired heritage and Sultanate regime of Ottoman Empire. (17)

Therefore, political motives which are person-oriented have never bear dominant importance in Turkish history. This situation resulted from the sense of belonging between state and citizen. It was created by the citizens who correspond to person in republic. As distinct from West, citizens are unaware of the special space in which state can never intervene. They make sense of their own existence as ummah in Ottoman Empire and national existence in Republic. In brief, Turkish citizens had to sustain their existence in the public area determined by the state as a dependent variable of state according to Turkish citizen. Gökalp (18) cry out the deep structure having been formed since Ottoman Empire by saying "There is no right but duty". Turkish citizens imprisoned themselves to "following" psychos by equalizing individual entity to pull their weight, follow their leader whoever he/she is. (19)

#### *A. Decisiveness of Geography*

Currently, a substantial majority of Turkish society adopts AKP government and its leader Recep Erdoğan. The main reason for this situation is authoritarian- sharp leadership

understanding represented by Recep Erdoğan. Liberal segment which is aware that they can not draw a political conclusion to accomplish their goals on their own; they try to shape the theoretical background of AKP. It was as if they can reveal individual rights and freedoms via an Islamist authoritarian party. Furthermore, even liberal authors argue that they base Islam in main problems. Islam which has not based on any concrete content about main problems such as foreign policy, economy, immigration and unemployment, need an external solid political theory. All these force AKP fort his tacit coalition.

As it can clearly be seen throughout the discussion mentioned above, long explanations were necessary in order to point out to the government pattern which was formed by facing present internal dynamics and founding elites. In this context, such a structure can not stand without foreign support. As each political rule need certain foreign support in order to stand, current situation in Turkey can not be considered strange. However, "dangerous initiative attitude" of current rule about Kurdish problem, Armenian question, EU membership and the problematic region where the country settled in can cause serious problems in this geography where "keeping it's own counsel" is a key for success. Moreover, some can clearly state the fate of Turkey is determined according to with its own geography (20).

#### *B. Provocative Questions about Foreign Policy*

Main questions about Chechnya and Kosovo are as follows: Is it a logical decision to contradict Russia the closest rival of USA in case of possible disagreement with a super power or a contradiction with the policies of this super power in order to avoid sanctions? Can a tacit coalition attempt defining Caucasia and Chechnya as the backyard of Russia and front yard of Ankara in order not to follow policies with USA for determining Caucasia hinterland, can be beneficial? Is it not compatible with national interests to adopt foreign policies supporting the present national unities of states as in the example of Spain which insists on not recognizing Kosovo due to ethnic clashes? Cooperation with powerful countries which are aware of unity question especially in the Kurdish initiative, is seem to be the most critic melting point of "Turkish problem" within the coming 10 years period, so each government will be punished/cheered on its assumption towards Kurdish issue. So to stand still as a regional superpower, "the fate of the Turks" should not be an outcome of "the fate of the Kurds"..

In this context, Israel as the representative of Jewish community should be accepted as a "strategic partner" rather than an "old friend" because two countries have had healthy relations since five century. In this sense, can a Gramscian "historical block" alliance between two communities only be explained via sensitive attitude? Furthermore, according to temporality between two processes, can the thesis, "Kurdish initiative is the charge of the 'One minute' boom bringing momentum to AKP in pre-election period" be underestimated? Kurdish initiative is perceived as a "Jewish beadledom". On the contrary, while the Jewish lobbies clemently supporting Turkey in international platforms are offended, global power groups used "One minute" boom as the "godsend" for Kurdish initiative anticipated by USA and EU.

#### *C. Kurdish Problem: Initiative or "Contemporary Royal Edict of Reform"?*

According to reflection of process on internal politics, there is a threat of micro secession of country with Kurdish initiative. Turkey has a half split image in terms of future of Kemalism. When compared with Ottoman history, declaration of II Constitutional Period Contemporary Royal Edict of Reform were based on an extremely optimist view on citizenship axis. The reforms were realized against Western countries during the Conference of Constantinople (21). Presently, USA tries to stand in Iraq by playing Kurdish trump and control Iraqi energy reserves by Iraqi police force. EU member states are properly chary of Turkey's membership. Both USA and EU can have a positive stance on Turkey which is purified from Kurdish population. Probably, global power groups may want to initiate the borders of EU the biggest supporter of USA with a "puppet Kurdish state" rather than Turkey.

However all these possibilities do not decrease the problems of Turkey but increase them. Firstly, decisively application of Kurdish initiative and its "cadet" Armenian initiative can drag Turkey into "unstable" and "incapable" state. In this context, Turkish Republic based on a tacit "ethnicity coalition" holdover from Ottoman Empire, can lose national integrity with contemporary "Royal Edict of Reforms" and turn into a "feast table" where ethnic groups can leave whenever they wish. Additionally, Islamist methods can "shake" country with micro-nationalist flows as the last period of the Ottoman Empire. If the sayings of Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan "by digesting and having it digested" means digesting foreign demands and having them "digested" in the country, the inner chain of the game will be broken due to dissatisfaction of national groups. (22) Therefore, game theory of the present administration will be broken at the beginning.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION: OPTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY EITHER WITH AKP OR WITHOUT AKP**

Apparently, AKP receives foreign support by changing power balances in Turkey. Both EU and USA try to prevent harsh reactions from Ankara about Kurdish problem by diluting the influence of army on politics. However, relations between AKP and West are not a familiar "strategic partnership" but a "cyclical cooperation". Because Western powers know that the alternative of AKP is a "nationalist government Formula" composed of CHP –MHP. Especially USA fears that a possible national front government would disrupt Kurdish trump in "dangerous social engineering initiative" and the understanding of "Green Belt Islam". In a sense, AKP is like the "carrot" offered by Washington against unacceptable Islamist trends.

In this context, AKP show that moderate Islamist parties can hold government reconciled with super power of world as long as free market economy and democratic atmosphere prevail. West offers the example of "Islamist democracy" in Turkey to "naughty countries". However, applicators of this plan make strategic mistakes, because, AKP does not follow a course like Iran, Lebanon and Palestine in terms of conservatism. On the contrary, Turkey is facing "naughtiness" as Turkey lived under the shadow of Kemalism for years and



even tried to provide the basis for revolution laws. West offers a political program that envisages fighting against Western value supports to a country which was advised to leave the revanchist tendencies. Imbalance between two different structures reveals that AKP type Islamist democracy is not a good option for alleviating “naughty” Islamist movements contrary to thoughts of some social engineers. (23) Because, there is not social conditions for taking inspiration from radical Turkey in Middle East where there are many radical Islamist elements.

AKP is likely to make a profound profit and loss account following the elections because AKP did not acquired many things rather than diluting the influence of army on politics, increasing vote levels in East via identity politics, forming a bourgeoisie for itself. AKP became the first party in elections but injured. The party conducts international relations with the USA and EU unilaterally. These relations can be summarized as follows: “Solve Cyprus problem, not consider Nagorno Karabagh/Prevent army but we have a similar stance on headscarf problem with Kemalist secular segment/ Emancipate minorities, not demand about the rights of Turkish minorities in EU/Support countries which we support but not anticipate our support for the international organizations and actors which you support.” (24)

Consequently, it will be more beneficial for Turkey to return classical foreign policy by excluding hesitations/options about internal politics while forming midterm international relations politics. Furthermore, Turkey can turn the process into an advantage by adopting the “the spiral of silence” introduced by England instead of taking initiative in every issue. In this context, underdeveloped countries like Turkey, must play their trump card; use every issue as a matter of negotiation in order to benefit from the globalization process. In this touch-and-go process, the main aim of difficult geographies whose social ties are on thin ice like Turkey is “gain time” rather than “make use of time”.

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- “Pan-Turkism in the Late- Otoman Era” in, Global Affairs in a Turbulent World: Perspectives and Controversies, Edited by: Yannis A. Stivachtis (2008)
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